



Country Profile: Syria

Mobilising Local Financing for ECD in Crisis (ECDiC)

An institutional and fiscal analysis of
ECD-relevant sectors amid Syria's
political transition

January 2026

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Acknowledgements

This Syria Country Profile reflects the work of many people whose contributions strengthened its quality and relevance.

I would like to acknowledge Nour Jarrouj, who led the process working closely with our lead consultant, Ryan Burgess, whose analytical approach and guidance shaped the structure and insights of this profile. We also recognise Benjemain Feve and Karam Al Shaar, whose research, fiscal expertise and contextual understanding added essential depth to the final report.

Our thanks go to our Syrian colleagues from UNICEF, Agha Khan Foundation, Aid Fund for Syria, World Vision Syria, People In Need Syria, Basmeh W Zeitooneh and IRC for their collaboration and for providing local knowledge that enhanced the accuracy and usefulness of the report.


Lola Ayanda, in collaboration with Odunmbaku Olagoke, led the design and visual presentation of this report.

We are grateful to all contributors for their commitment and collaborative efforts.

Katie Murphy PhD, MPH
Interim Director



Executive Summary



Syria faces one of the world’s most severe ECD challenges: a young population, widespread destruction of essential services, deep fiscal collapse and declining humanitarian support.

Nearly **20 per cent** of Syrians are **under age 10**, but the systems responsible for their early health, nutrition, protection and learning have been critically weakened. Although the state budget has grown in nominal Syrian pounds, its real value has fallen sharply; combined Education, Health and Social Affairs budgets today amount to only a few hundred million dollars—around **6–10 per cent** of total expenditure.

Humanitarian financing has also deteriorated: people in need rose from

 **11.1 million**
in 2020

 **16.5 million**
in 2025

while funding coverage collapsed from
 **63%** → **27%**

As a result, ECD-relevant services across education, health, nutrition and WASH face facility closures, staffing shortages, weakened outreach and growing inequities, especially for children in hard-to-reach, displaced or impoverished communities.



The December 2024 political transition has created both openings and constraints. Budget processes remain provisional, with investment spending effectively frozen under “one-twelfth” allocations, limiting ministries’ ability to expand services or rehabilitate infrastructure. Meanwhile, the national ECD strategy—drafted earlier but never launched—is now being revised by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (MoSAL), Ministry of Education (MoE) and Ministry of Health (MoH) with UNICEF support. This offers an opportunity to clarify roles, strengthen coordination and embed ECD more firmly in future budgets, but implementation capacity remains limited and coordination inconsistent.

Across both public and humanitarian systems, the central problem is financial invisibility. No ministry has an ECD budget line, detailed budget books are not published, and humanitarian reporting remains fragmented. As a result, neither government nor partners can track how much is spent on ECD, where it goes or which children benefit. Governmental oversight structures exist but lack independence, and abrupt donor withdrawals have repeatedly disrupted essential services for young children.

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children.

Despite these constraints, practical steps can improve financing and execution. On the public side, gradually increasing the shares of MoE, MoH and MoSAL budgets—and earmarking sub-lines for ECE, 0–3 services, child protection and maternal and child health—would strengthen predictability. On the humanitarian and development side, donors can introduce ECD markers within existing sector envelopes, prioritise multi-year funding and scale cost-effective models already in use (ECE spaces in schools, PHC-based parenting and MIYCN counselling, community ECD models). A simple ECD budget “tag” across government and humanitarian systems would significantly improve visibility and equity, guiding resources toward underserved areas such as eastern Syria, Idlib and northern Aleppo, and the increasingly fragile coastal governorates.

Overall, needs far exceed available resources, but opportunities exist to strengthen systems, improve accountability and protect Syria’s youngest children during and after the crisis.

► **19 November 2025** - Homs, Syria. Fatima 63, shares a meal with her children and grandchildren in their home in Al-Qusayr.



Country Overview and Context

A. Demographic profile and implications for ECD

Syria remains a relatively large country in demographic terms, with government estimates putting the resident population at 29.6 million in 2022 across the 14 governorates (see Table 1)¹. Other estimates, such as UN demographic projections for 2024 suggest a total population of around 24.7 million. The age structure is distinctly young: almost 20 per cent of the population is under the age of 10, and more than 40 per cent is under 20 (see Table 2). This “youth bulge” is highly relevant for ECD as it implies a large and growing cohort of infants and young children, whose health, nutrition, early learning and protection needs must be met in a context of shrinking fiscal space, damaged infrastructure and protracted crisis.

Table 1: Population (2022)

Governorate	Total (1,000)	Female (1,000)	Male (1,000)
Damascus	1,833	933	900
Aleppo	7,120	3,563	3,557
Rural Damascus	2,327	1,162	1,165
Homs	2,616	1,308	1,308
Hama	2,638	1,315	1,323
Lattakia	1,395	702	693
Idlib	2,339	1,158	1,181
Hassakeh	2,045	1,027	1,018
Deir-ez-Zor	2,209	1,110	1,099
Tartous	1,105	556	549
Raqqa	1,315	661	654
Daraa	1,525	757	768
Suweida	564	281	283
Quneitra	604	306	298
Total	29,635	14,839	14,796

Source: Central Bureau of Statistics (Government)

¹The Central Bureau of Statistics did not share the methodology underlying its population figures. As such, these estimates should be interpreted with caution, especially given the high numbers of Syrian refugees and IDPs.

Table 2: Population Pyramid (2024)

Age	Male	Female	Total	Share (%)	Cumulative (%)
0-4	1,255,760	1,199,327	2,455,087	9.95%	9.95%
5-9	1,028,897	983,612	2,012,509	8.16%	18.11%
10-14	1,397,864	1,329,963	2,727,827	11.06%	29.16%
15-19	1,489,605	1,433,805	2,923,410	11.85%	41.01%
20-24	1,453,734	1,420,940	2,874,674	11.65%	52.66%
25-29	1,187,584	1,151,943	2,339,527	9.48%	62.15%
30-34	832,034	797,626	1,629,660	6.61%	68.75%
35-39	735,043	732,197	1,467,240	5.95%	74.70%
40-44	661,243	684,938	1,346,181	5.46%	80.15%
45-49	586,749	620,387	1,207,136	4.89%	85.05%
50-54	490,966	531,577	1,022,543	4.14%	89.19%
55-59	399,868	443,510	843,378	3.42%	92.61%
60-64	304,169	349,500	653,669	2.65%	95.26%
65-69	220,929	263,358	484,287	1.96%	97.22%
70-74	145,372	183,140	328,512	1.33%	98.55%
75-79	92,146	112,987	205,133	0.83%	99.38%
80-84	41,502	58,351	99,853	0.40%	99.79%
85-89	14,120	25,694	39,814	0.16%	99.95%
90-94	3,237	7,613	10,850	0.04%	99.99%
95-99	331	1,062	1,393	0.01%	100.00%
100+	10	53	63	0.00%	100.00%
Total	12,341,163	12,331,583	24,672,746	100.00%	-

Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. World Population Prospects: The 2024 Revision. (Medium variant)

B. Public expenditure trends and fiscal constraints

Syria's state budget has grown sharply in nominal Syrian pounds (SYP) but collapsed in US dollar (USD) terms, reflecting massive currency depreciation and constrained revenue.

The overall budget rose from

SYP 754 billion

in 2010 to

SYP 35.5 trillion

in 2024, yet its dollar value peaked at around

USD 17–18 billion

in 2012 and is now only about

USD 2.4 billion

in 2024.²

In terms of budget execution, actual spending rose from about

50% to 60%

of planned expenditure between 2012 and 2015 to over

85% to 95%

between 2021 and 2023.³

However, higher execution of a much smaller, highly constrained budget does not translate into adequate social spending.⁴

²The USD values are calculated using the average black-market exchange rate of the Syrian pound during the relevant year.

³Syrian State end-of-year accounts obtained by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited.


⁴Due to the severe depreciation of the SYP between 2019 and 2024, high budget execution does not necessarily indicate that allocations were genuinely respected. Rather, it could reflect rising SYP costs driven by currency depreciation, which can make allocations appear fully spent even when their equivalent value in USD was never actually reached.

Such a fiscal position represents several challenges for ECD. Since 2011, spending has shifted heavily toward security, defence and war-related costs, while investment and social sector allocations contracted sharply.⁵ Development spending fell from 46 per cent of the budget in 2011 to around 15–18 per cent in

2021–2022, recovering only partially to 25 per cent in 2024.⁶ Health and education budgets declined steeply in real terms, and successive cuts to fuel, electricity and bread subsidies deepened household poverty, reducing families’ capacity to invest in children’s wellbeing.

Chat 1: State Budget and Execution Rate

Source: Syrian Government Calculations and data compiled by Karam Shaar Advisory Ltd.




Decreasing budget expenditure has also translated into a pronounced shift in the composition of public spending, with a growing share absorbed by current (recurrent) expenditure at the expense of investment spending (see Chart 2). Across key ECD-relevant ministries, this trend reflects the state’s increasing focus on wages, operating costs, and short-term survival rather than system

expansion or capital formation. This growing dominance of recurrent expenditure leaves little fiscal space for investment in pre-primary facilities, health infrastructure, workforce expansion, or quality improvements—core components of sustainable ECD systems—thereby entrenching a cycle of underinvestment despite rising nominal budgets.

Chat 2: Budget Expenditure Allocated to Current Expenditure for Key ECD Ministries (%)

Source: Syrian Government Calculations and data compiled by Karam Shaar Advisory Ltd.



⁵Based on Karam Shaar Advisory Limited’s analysis of the Syrian state budget.

⁶Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, *Assad’s Regime and the Budget: Living on Paper Time*. [LINK](#)


⁷Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, *Rethinking Subsidies in the Post-Assad Era*. [LINK](#)

Even where nominal allocations have increased, the collapse of the SYP has eroded the real value of social sector budgets (see Chart 3). The MoH’s SYP budget reached 6.57 trillion in 2024, yet its dollar equivalent—around USD 440 million—remains far below pre-war levels. The MoE has also expanded its budget, including allocations for the Regional ECD Center (see Chart 4), but the real purchasing power of these funds is extremely limited. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour has seen notable nominal growth, but inflation, rising needs and currency depreciation mean that resources remain insufficient to rebuild or scale ECD-relevant systems

These fiscal pressures are compounded by structural transparency and accountability gaps. Detailed budget documents and final accounts are rarely published, and significant expenditures—such as military spending or subsidies—are often hidden under opaque headings like the Public Debt Fund.⁸ External oversight remains weak, and the Central Financial Control Authority (CFCA) lacks operational independence. With sectoral and local budgets offering little clarity on actual spending for pre-primary education, child protection or maternal and child health, tracking public ECD expenditure—and assessing its adequacy, efficiency or equity—remains extremely difficult (see Annex 1).


Chat 3: Expenditures on Key ECD Ministries

Source: Syrian Government Calculations and data compiled by Karam Shaar Advisory Ltd.



Chat 4: Funds Allocated to the ECD Regional Center

Source: Syrian Government Calculations and data compiled by Karam Shaar Advisory Ltd.



⁸Based on Karam Shaar Advisory Limited’s analysis of the Syrian state budget.

C. Humanitarian needs, funding trends and sectoral pressures

To make up for the lack of state finances and a deteriorated fiscal position, the country must rely on international humanitarian aid, as Syria remains one of the world’s largest humanitarian crises.⁹

Between 2020 and 2025, the UN-led humanitarian plans show steadily rising needs and falling funding coverage. People in need increased from 11.1 million in 2020 to 16.5 million in 2025, including a rise from 4.7 million to 7.8 million children. Over the same period, financial requirements grew from USD 3.8 billion to over USD 5.4 billion in 2023, and to USD 3.2–4.1 billion in 2024–2025. Meanwhile, the share of the response plan that was actually funded fell sharply—from around 63 per cent in 2020 to just 27 per cent in 2025 (see Chart 5).

Chat 4: UN’s Syria Humanitarian Response Plan Overview

Source: UN OCHA Calculations and data compiled by Karam Shaar Advisory Ltd.



As of January 11, 2026, the Syrian Humanitarian Response Plan has yet to be published. However, humanitarian actors consistently underline that overall needs remain at least as severe as in 2025, with no meaningful improvement in food security, access to basic services, or household coping capacity.¹¹





⁸Based on Karam Shaar Advisory Limited’s analysis of the Syrian state budget.

⁹UN Crisis Relief, Syria: Now is the time to build a future. [LINK](#)

¹⁰Humanitarian Action, Syrian Arab Republic. [LINK](#)

¹¹Based on Karam Shaar Advisory Limited’s bilateral discussions with humanitarian actors inside Syria.

Table 3: Sectoral Impacts of Humanitarian Programmes Underfunding on ECD

Sector	People in Need / Scale	Service/System Conditions	Key ECD-Relevant Impacts
 Education ¹²	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 7.8 million children in need (2025) • 2.45 million out of school • >1 million at risk of dropping out 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 5,200+ schools damaged/destroyed • Overcrowded, poorly equipped classrooms • Frequent lack of electricity and WASH • Low/irregular teacher salaries • Loss of major US education funding 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reduced access to ECE and early learning • Lower teaching quality and workforce availability • Families deprioritise early education due to costs • ECE overshadowed by emergency school rehabilitation needs
 Health ¹³	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 15.9 million people in need 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 38% of hospitals and 59% of PHCs partially/non-functional • Recurrent disease outbreaks (cholera, measles, etc.) • 150+ facilities closed after US funding cuts • Only 1 in 16 public hospitals fully functional in NES 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Disruption of maternal & newborn health services • Weak vaccination, antenatal/postnatal care • Reduced growth monitoring and neonatal care • Increased risks to child survival and development (MHPSS, early stimulation gaps)
 Nutrition ¹⁴	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 6.4 million people need nutrition services 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Weak service coverage across most governorates • Stabilisation centres and mobile teams closed • Funding cuts halt SAM treatment for many children 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increasing severe acute malnutrition among infants & young children • Pregnant/lactating women lack essential services • High risk of irreversible developmental delays in first 1,000 days
 WASH ¹⁵	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 14.4 million people in need 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Major damage to water & power infrastructure • Reliance on unsafe water trucking • Funding shortfalls limit repairs • Poor WASH in schools and child-friendly spaces 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Higher incidence of waterborne diseases (cholera, diarrhoea) • Increased malnutrition risk for children under 5 • Reduced attendance and learning outcomes, especially for girls

¹²Humanitarian Action, 3.4 Education. [LINK](#)

¹³Humanitarian Action, 3.6 Health. [LINK](#)

¹⁴Humanitarian Action, 3.7 Nutrition. [LINK](#)

¹⁵Humanitarian Action, 3.9 Water Sanitation and Hygiene. [LINK](#)

Syria's displacement crisis should also be taken into account when considering the country's ECD conditions. Over 7 million Syrians remain internally displaced, including 3 million (43%) who are 17 years old or younger,¹⁶ while a further 6.2 million live as refugees abroad.¹⁷ Following the collapse of the Assad regime, the situation of these refugees begs the question of return. Since December 8, 2024, 1.2 million Syrians have returned.¹⁸ Yet, challenges for returnees persist, as many return to "destroyed homes and infrastructure, weak and damaged basic services."¹⁹

As a result, it can only be assumed that a large number of young Syrian children are growing up in severely constrained areas where education, health, nutrition and WASH systems are overstretched and underfunded.

D. ECD Since December 8, 2024

Fiscal Space

The political transition in December 2024 has not yet produced a fully transparent or predictable fiscal framework. In early 2025, the Caretaker Council of Ministers extended the 2024 budget on a "one-twelfth" provisional basis, limiting spending primarily to current expenditures such as salaries, basic operations, and essential fuel allocations.²⁰ This has constrained the fiscal space available for scaling up ECD programmes, rehabilitating social infrastructure, and expanding services to underserved areas. Since then, and through January 2026, the interim government appears to have continued operating under this provisional framework, with no detailed 2025 budget formally published.

While the Ministry of Finance has announced work on a supplementary 2025 budget and a "qualitative leap" in the design of the 2026 budget,²¹ concrete reforms and their implications for social sector and ECD spending remain unclear. The limited information publicly disclosed regarding the 2025 budget comes primarily from statements by the Minister of Finance, Yisr Barnieh,

who noted in an interview that government finances recorded a USD 500 million surplus in 2025 and that total budgetary expenditure amounted to approximately USD 3 billion.²² Regarding 2026, Mr. Barnieh indicated that the budget would not be submitted for approval before the formation of a new Parliament, effectively pushing the timeline for adoption further into the year.²³

For ECD, this interim fiscal regime poses two interlinked challenges: first, the reliance on provisional budgeting and expenditure restraint—particularly the reported compression of investment spending—limits the state's ability to rehabilitate facilities, expand service delivery, and fund preventive and early-intervention programmes. Second, the continued delay in adopting a fully approved budget framework, alongside limited public detail on allocations, sustains uncertainty over whether—and how quickly—the authorities will re-prioritise education, health, nutrition, and social protection, constraining planning, predictability, and the sustainability of ECD-relevant systems.

¹⁶UNHCR, *Syria Governorates IDPs and IDP Returnees Overview (As of 11 Dec 2025)*. [LINK](#)

¹⁷UNHCR, *Syrian Arab Republic*. [LINK](#)

¹⁸European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, *Syria*. [LINK](#)

¹⁹UNHCR, *A million Syrians have returned home, but more support needed so millions more can follow*. [LINK](#)

²⁰EnabBaladi, *Syrian "Finance Ministry": No major deficit in the 2025 budget*. [LINK](#)

²¹963Media, *Syria's State Budget: Between the Numbers of the Past and the Dreams of the Future*. [LINK](#)

²²SyriaNow - *تيرومجال نولاص - ننييروسال رظنتنت تيلاام تاحالص إي . . قديدجال قلمعلا ءاروام نألا ايروس*. [LINK](#)

²³SyriaNow - *تيرومجال نولاص - ننييروسال رظنتنت تيلاام تاحالص إي . . قديدجال قلمعلا ءاروام نألا ايروس*. [LINK](#)

Local and International Developments

Despite fiscal constraints and a deteriorated service environment, the interim government remains in strong coordination with international partners to sustain or expand support to education, health, and child-focused services. These agreements have enabled a handful of ECD-relevant initiatives to move forward.

Yet, within this constrained fiscal environment, several ECD initiatives were nonetheless launched. The MoE introduced a Rapid Response Plan in the education sector, alongside a long-term strategy to guide education reforms, prioritising access to learning, psychosocial support, child protection, school reintegration, and reduced dropout, while also promoting digital empowerment, personal development, and global competitiveness.²⁴ In parallel, the national school calendar and education framework were unified for the first time in over a decade, signalling efforts toward a more cohesive and inclusive education system.²⁵ UNICEF is also supporting the Ministry through the “Back-to-Learning” campaign to help ensure that children across Syria can reclaim their right to education.²⁶

Complementing these efforts, the Ministry of Education and the German Development Bank (KfW) discussed


expanding cooperation to improve Syria’s educational environment, with KfW pledging EUR 20 million in grant financing to support the “No Lost Generation” programme with UNICEF, rehabilitate schools, and advance sustainable child-focused development projects.²⁷

Amid a widening gap in service provision—exacerbated by the suspension of U.S. funding²⁸—the MoH launched a nationwide nutritional survey aimed at addressing rising malnutrition. The survey will cover all governorates and assess the nutritional status of children under five and women of reproductive age (15–49), with the goal of identifying priority areas and informing targeted interventions.²⁹

In parallel, child protection efforts are also gaining attention. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour (MoSAL) and Terre des Hommes agreed on a €1.5 million funding package to strengthen child-protection services, including upgrades to juvenile care centres and facilities addressing child begging. The support will also finance logistical improvements and vocational training to help vulnerable children acquire skills and improve their prospects for reintegration.³⁰

Chart 5: Fundraisers Main Donations

Source: Various online reports. Data compiled by Karam Shaar Advisory Ltd.



²⁴SANA, Ministry of Education launches a rapid response plan and long-term strategy for the future of education in Syria. [LINK](#)

²⁵UNICEF, A new chapter for education in Syria: Back-to-Learning campaign presents new opportunities to millions of students in Syria. [LINK](#)

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷SANA, ايروس يف ظروفتم ةيميل عت ةئيب ريفوتل نواعتل زيزعت يناملأا ةيمنتلا كنب عم ثحبت ةيبرتل. [LINK](#)

²⁸Humanitarian Action, 3.7 Nutrition. [LINK](#)

²⁹SANA, Syria launches nationwide nutritional survey to address malnutrition. [LINK](#)

³⁰SANA, EU allocates €1.5 million to support child-protection programmes in Syria. [LINK](#)

At the national level, a strategy for ECD is reportedly under development, though it has yet to be published (see ‘section e’ below). In the meantime, domestic philanthropy and community-based financing have emerged as a visible—if uneven—stopgap response to persistent service gaps and constrained public spending. Since mid-2025, large-scale local fundraising campaigns at the governorate and municipal levels have mobilised substantial resources³¹ for education, health, WASH, and basic services, with education consistently reported as a top priority.

Table 4: Top 20 Donors in Domestic Fundraising Campaigns (2025)

Donor / Entity	Total Contribution (USD)	Type of Contribution	Campaign(s)
Ghassan Aboud	55,000,000	Cash	Al-Wafa li-Idlib
Ministry of Finance	30,000,000	Cash (public budget)	Abshiri Houran; Deir al-Izz
SAMS Organisation	15,400,000	Project funding	Deir al-Izz; Al-Wafa li-Idlib
United Nations Fund(s)	14,000,000	Project funding	Al-Wafa li-Idlib
Mowaffaq Qaddah	11,000,000	Cash	Arbaa Homs; Abshiri Houran; Deir al-Izz
Al-Ameen for Humanitarian Support	10,113,000	Cash	Al-Wafa li-Idlib
Residents of Deir Attieh	10,000,000	Cash	Rifna Bistahel
Ayman Asfari	10,000,000	Cash	Al-Wafa li-Idlib
Red Crescent (Syrian Arab RC + RC projects)	9,700,000	Project funding	Deir al-Izz; Al-Wafa li-Idlib; As-Suwayda
Murtadilat Huna Company	8,000,000	Cash	Rifna Bistahel
Ministry of Local Administration	6,500,000	Project funding	Al-Wafa li-Idlib
IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation	6,000,000	Project funding	Al-Wafa li-Idlib
Istanbul Bosphorus Educational & Cultural Endowment	5,000,000	Cash	Rifna Bistahel
Friends of Mousa Al-Omar	4,000,000	Cash	Rifna Bistahel
Residents of Yabroud	2,500,000	Cash	Rifna Bistahel
Al-Rashid Al-Rawadi Family	2,500,000	Cash	Deir al-Izz
Mohammad Al-Akkad	2,500,000	Cash	Rifna Bistahel
Expatriates in Germany	2,050,000	Cash	Deir al-Izz
Nabil Al-Hakami	2,000,000	Cash	Arbaa Homs
Al-Durra Company	2,000,000	Cash	Rifna Bistahel

Source: Various online reports. Data compiled by Karam Shaar Advisory Ltd.

³¹Karam Shaar Advisory Ltd., *From Solidarity to Strategy: The Rise and Risks of Community Financing in Syria's Reconstruction*. [LINK](#)

While these initiatives demonstrate renewed local agency and the capacity of domestic and diaspora actors to mobilise quickly, available data indicate that a significant share of announced funding reflects a mix of cash donations, in-kind contributions, project pledges, and recycled public or NGO funds rather than wholly new resources.³² As a result, domestic philanthropy currently functions as a complementary and largely ad hoc financing channel rather than a predictable or programmatic source of ECD support, raising important questions about sustainability, governance, and alignment with emerging national ECD frameworks.

Implications for Political Economy

Syria's post-transition political economy is shaping ECD outcomes through two reinforcing dynamics: the emerging development model and the state's evolving service-delivery approach.

Without clear state priorities and regulatory discipline, economic reopening is likely to default toward rentier, urban-centred investment—especially in real estate, tourism, and services—benefiting narrow elites and external investors while generating limited employment and widening territorial inequality. For ECD, this trajectory risks deepening household vulnerability (through precarious, informal livelihoods), accelerating rural–urban migration and displacement pressures, and widening disparities in access to early learning, health, nutrition, and protection services across governorates.

By contrast, a development strategy that deliberately steers investment toward labour-absorbing productive sectors—particularly agriculture and light manufacturing—would strengthen household incomes, reduce geographic exclusion, and create more stable conditions for families to invest in children's development, while also enabling more distributed service ecosystems beyond major cities.

At the same time, early governance patterns under the new authorities suggest limited direct public provision and a continuation of former patterns of minimum state service delivery as seen in Idlib,³³ with reliance on international actors, humanitarian systems, local business networks, and diaspora financing. Given constrained public budgets, especially at local levels, this hybrid model is likely to keep ECD-relevant services fragmented, uneven, and vulnerable to funding volatility. Moreover, the combination of weak institutions, limited administrative capacity, and scarce fiscal space also raises risks that any rapid influx of external resources might not be properly executed and could reinforce patronage and corruption rather than strengthen accountable service systems.

In practice, this implies that ECD will remain highly dependent on humanitarian financing and community-led coping mechanisms in the near term, with meaningful improvements contingent on gradual institutional consolidation—particularly the rebuilding of credible local governance, predictable public financing for social sectors, and regulatory frameworks that align reconstruction and investment with child- and family-centred development priorities.

³²Karam Shaar Advisory Ltd., *From Solidarity to Strategy: The Rise and Risks of Community Financing in Syria's Reconstruction*. [LINK](#)

³³Hayaat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) previously exercised de facto control over Idlib governorate through the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), which functioned as its civilian administrative arm prior to the December 2024 transition.

E. ECD Priority Level

ECD Policy Landscape

Syria has developed the building blocks of a national ECD policy framework, although implementation and financing remain limited.

A national ECD strategy was drafted for 2020–2025 under the former Syrian Commission for Family Affairs, with contributions from MoSAL, MoH and other stakeholders. The document was finalised but never formally launched. Following the December 2024 political transition, the strategy is now being revised to align with the new context, with MoSAL emerging as the lead institution and the Commission's role significantly reduced. Planned high-profile launches were postponed after ministries recognised that roles, pillars and responsibilities were not adequately defined.

Still, at the governmental level, ECD coordination takes place through a nascent but still fragile set of mechanisms. An inter-ministerial ECD committee or

platform, originally convened under the Commission for Family Affairs and now coordinated by MoSAL, brings together MoE, MoH, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Interior and key partners such as UNICEF. This body was central to drafting the original ECD strategy and is now engaged in its revision. Moreover, the updated strategy reportedly includes a chapter on monitoring, coordination and periodic review, setting out planned roles and meeting schedules.

In practice, however, interviewees describe coordination as inconsistent and often symbolic. Ministries sometimes send junior technical staff rather than empowered decision-makers, and follow-up on agreed actions is uneven. ECD is not yet a core agenda item for many sector representatives, particularly outside MoE and MoSAL.

Accountability mechanisms

Accountability for ECD financing and results is currently weak, both in the public finance system and in the On the public finance side, the main issues are the lack of explicit ECD budget line in any ministry and consolidated ECD budget across MoE, MoH and MoSAL. As a result, it is extremely difficult to determine how much is being spent on ECD, where, and for whom. Similarly, detailed budget books and final accounts are not regularly

published and sectoral or sub-national breakdowns do not identify ECD components. The Central Financial Control Authority and parliamentary oversight bodies exist but lack independence and public reporting. It should be noted, however, that these systems are being restructured and that the current authorities have repeatedly affirmed that transparency and accountability would be key elements of any future policy making.

³⁴Yamen Mostafa, interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 12, 2025; Wathek Al-Hallak, interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 13, 2025.

³⁵Yamen Mostafa, interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 12, 2025; Wathek Al-Hallak, interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 13, 2025.

³⁶Yamen Mostafa, interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 12, 2025.

³⁷Wathek Al-Hallak, interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 13, 2025.

³⁸Yamen Mostafa, interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 12, 2025; Wathek Al-Hallak, interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 13, 2025.

³⁹Anonymised KII.

⁴⁰Anonymised KII.

⁴¹Most KIIs point to this.


⁴²Most KIIs consistently highlighted this.

In the humanitarian system, sector plans include indicators and targets, and cluster reporting provides some visibility on inputs and outputs (numbers of children reached with ECE programmes, SAM cases treated, WASH facilities rehabilitated, etc.). However, monitoring frameworks are largely sector-specific and project-based; they rarely track integrated early childhood outcomes across sectors, especially for children 0–5. Moreover, it does not appear that there is any joint mechanism to link humanitarian financial flows with

national budgets for ECD-relevant services, nor to manage the impact of sudden donor withdrawals (such as US funding cuts) on continuity of essential ECD-related services.

In addition to budgetary and institutional constraints, accountability for ECD is weakened by limited transparency and information-sharing between government institutions, UN agencies, and implementing partners. Establishing simple, standardised information-sharing protocols between MoSAL, MoE and MoH, UNICEF, and key

humanitarian and civil-society implementers—such as agreed templates on who is funding what, where, and through which delivery channels, alongside basic coverage data by governorate and advance notice of planned programme closures—would significantly reduce duplication, improve coordination, and help manage continuity risks when donors withdraw or funding pipelines shift. Such protocols would represent a low-cost but high-impact accountability enabler in the current constrained environment.⁴³



- ▶ Adam returned to Al-Qusayr with his family after years of displacement. Through its protection programme, the IRC provided psychosocial and recreational activities for his family while displaced in Lebanon.

ECD Financing and Implementation

A. Financing and Governance

Level of Allocation and Expenditure

Total public spending has fluctuated between 25% to 47% of GDP between 2010 and 2022, according to data from Syria's Central Bureau of Statistics and Official Gazette.⁴⁴ While budget expenditure expanded significantly during that period, its USD value collapsed. In 2024, total expenditure is around USD 2.4 billion, compared with over USD 16 billion 2010.

Chart 7: Planned Expenditures on Key ECD Ministries

Source: Syrian Government Calculations and data compiled by Karam Shaar Advisory Ltd.





Chart 8: State Expenditures/GDP Ratio

Source: Syrian state budget accessed via the Official Gazette. GDP data accessed via the Central Bureau of Statistics. Calculations and data compiled by Karam Shaar Advisory Ltd.



⁴⁴GDP figures unavailable for 2023 and 2024.

The three key ECD ministries (MoH, MoE, and MoSAL) together absorb only 6% to 10% of total public expenditure, well below what would be expected for social sectors in a child-rich, crisis-affected country. Throughout the conflict, combined MoH, MoE, and MoSAL budgets have fallen by around 87% in USD terms. Within that, MoE and MoSAL's budgets are both down by over 90%, while MoH's budget is down by about 50%.

Given this macro picture, the actual public allocation to ECD is likely to be extremely low, albeit unclear due to the lack of government communication on the topic. The combination of a shrinking state, low social-sector shares and very limited MoSAL funding severely constrains the ability to finance comprehensive ECD services.

It should be noted that the only item in the state budget mentioning ECD is the ECD Regional Center item under the MoE. Funding for this item went from USD 3.4 million in 2012 to USD 105,000 in 2024.

► Homs, Syria. Adams 8 Years old.



Ability to Spend Funds

There are both system-level and front-line constraints that limit how much ECD money can realistically be absorbed and used well.

At the apex of these constraints, fragmented mandates and weak coordination remain key.⁴⁵

Responsibility is split between the MoE, MoSAL, and MoH.

As mentioned earlier, however, coordination is described as inconsistent and often symbolic.⁴⁶

Within key ministries, processes and systems are considered weak. For MoSAL especially, the main obstacle is that processes and mechanisms are not in place: registration, bureaucracy

and ad hoc issues (e.g. child begging) consume time, while there's no robust system to plan, allocate and follow up ECD spending.⁴⁷ At the same time, there are gaps between strategies and implementation capacity. On paper, strategies and plans "look good,"⁴⁸ but there is a big implementation gap: limited coordination, unclear roles, and low prioritisation mean ministries struggle to turn plans into concrete, funded activities.⁴⁹

At the level of international financing and support, short funding cycles clash with long-term ECD outcomes.⁵⁰

Multi-Year Humanitarian Funding

(MYHF) is still not the norm,⁵¹ with aid programmes and funding usually disbursed for a maximum of 12 month-periods,⁵² which is fundamentally misaligned with the time horizon needed for ECD impact. This creates pressure to design projects that "look good" within a year but with limited long-term impact, rather than those that make best use of resources over several years and, thus, improve outcomes.⁵³

Domestically, there is no clear ECD budget line and no published data on how much is spent on ECD, making it hard to track whether funds are actually executed and where they go.⁵⁴

Policy implications

01 Issues on allocation or spending

As earlier figures have shown, the level of public and humanitarian financing available for ECD is clearly inadequate. In USD terms, combined budgets for the three key ECD ministries have fallen dramatically since 2010, while their share of total public expenditure remains in the single digits. MoE and MoSAL, which carry much of the responsibility for ECE, early grades and child protection, have been hit particularly hard.

On the aid side, sectoral plans for education, health, nutrition and WASH are increasingly underfunded, and only a small fraction of these constrained envelopes is explicitly dedicated to young children. ECD therefore competes for resources within already stretched systems rather than being financed as a clear priority.

⁴⁵Most KIIs agreed on this.

⁴⁶Anonymised KIIs (2).

⁴⁷Anonymised KIIs (2).

⁴⁸Anonymised KII (1).

⁴⁹Wathek Al-Hallak, interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 13, 2025.

⁵⁰Anonymised KII (1).

⁵¹Norwegian Refugee Council, *Living up to the promise of multi-year humanitarian financing*. [LINK](#)

⁵²Anonymised KII (1).

⁵³Anonymised KII (1).

⁵⁴This sentiment was reinforced by most KIIs.

Within this limited envelope, spending is often misaligned with what early childhood development in emergencies requires. As highlighted by the KIIs, public and humanitarian budgets understandably prioritise visible, short-term needs such as school and clinic rehabilitation, trauma care, water trucking and outbreak control, while some core elements of ECD (play-based ECE, parenting support, early stimulation, MHPSS for young children, workforce development) might seem secondary, and, thus, marginalised.

02 Ways to improve spending or execution of budget utilisation

In a constrained fiscal environment, the immediate priority is to use existing and incremental resources more strategically for ECD, rather than relying only on large new funding. On the public side, this means stabilising and gradually increasing the combined share of the budgets of MoH, MoE and MoSAL, and earmarking portions of these allocations for clearly defined early childhood functions: ECE and early grades in MoE, 0–3 and child protection in MoSAL, and maternal, neonatal and child health and nutrition in MoH.⁵⁵

On the humanitarian side, donors and pooled funds can set explicit ECD targets within education, health, nutrition and WASH envelopes and prioritise multi-year, systems-oriented ECD packages, rather than isolated one-year projects.⁵⁶ For example, school-embedded ECE spaces, primary healthcare (PHC)-based parenting and maternal, infant and young child nutrition (MIYCN) counselling, and community or blended ECD models already in use by partners offer cost-effective platforms for scaling.⁵⁷

Execution and accountability can be strengthened through simple, feasible reforms rather than complex overhauls. Introducing a basic ECD “tag” across MoE, MoH and MoSAL, mirrored by an ECD marker in cluster and pooled-fund reporting, would allow government and partners to see—for the first time—how much is being allocated and spent on ECD, by sector and by governorate.⁵⁸ Allocation criteria can then be adjusted to prioritise under-served areas (e.g. northwest and northeast Syria, hard-to-reach sub-districts, IDP-dense sites, refugee returns areas) and high-risk groups (children 0–5, children with disabilities, displaced children).⁵⁹ Annual joint reviews under the inter-ministerial ECD committee, a newly-created ECD division with the various humanitarian clusters that have an ECD component (education, health, WASH, nutrition) and key humanitarian actors would help link financial data to coverage and quality of services.⁶⁰

⁵⁵Yamen Mostafa, interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 12, 2025; Wathek Al-Hallak, interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 13, 2025; Nafisa Shekhova, interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 13, 2025; Murad Maithalouni, interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 17, 2025.

⁵⁶Moustafa Qaei, interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 12, 2025; Murad Maithalouni, interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 17, 2025.

⁵⁷Hadi Al-Thib, interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 12, 2025; Moustafa Qaei, interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 12, 2025; Nafisa Shekhova, interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 13, 2025.

⁵⁸Proposal derived from the budget and the fact that there are no budget lines related to ECD.

⁵⁹Based on HRP programming and KIIs (Moustafa Qaei, Hozyfa Al-Tfankji)

⁶⁰Wathek Al-Hallak, interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 13, 2025; Yamen Mostafa, interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 12, 2025; Hozyfa Al-Tfankji, interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 12, 2025; Murad Maithalouni; Murad Maithalouni, interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 17, 2025.

In parallel, building a stronger evidence base for ECD prioritisation is essential. Developing a “[Public Finance for Children](#)” analysis (or Child National Accounts) would allow systematic mapping of how public budgets, humanitarian financing, and household resources flow to children, including specific ECD sub-components. Such analysis would support more informed budget tagging, clearer governorate-level targeting, and stronger advocacy for dedicated ECD sub-lines within existing sector budgets. To institutionalise this approach, a small technical leadership group on public finance for children—linked to the inter-ministerial ECD committee—could oversee methodology, ensure continuity of analysis, and anchor evidence-based advocacy for ECD within both public finance and humanitarian decision-making processes.⁶¹

B. Selected Areas for Intervention

Needs are severe everywhere in **Syria—16.5 million people** are in need—so the value of the case study is not “where need exists,” but where financing flows face possible constraints.

A first strong case-study option is Eastern Syria (Deir-ez-Zor, Al-Hasakeh and Ar-Raqqa). The east is relatively hard for the central government to reach consistently, and service delivery relies heavily on humanitarian channels and external implementers. This makes it a useful setting to map how funding moves (donor/UN/NGO → implementing partner → facility/community) under access constraints, insecurity, damaged infrastructure and limited state footprint. At the same time, given the state’s fiscal weakness, differences in government presence may not translate into large differences in ECD service levels.

A second high-value case-study is Idlib and northern Aleppo, precisely because the dynamics are changing. Historically, these areas benefitted from a dense NGO ecosystem and cross-border coordination via

the Northwest Syria Hub operating from Gaziantep (Turkey), which meant, despite no Damascus government presence, service provision was still assured by NGOs. However, with the political transition and the shift of authorities toward Damascus, NGOs and coordination structures are gradually moving from the Northwest Syria/Gaziantep cluster logic to a Damascus-based architecture.⁶² This creates a real risk that Idlib could experience a comparatively larger drop in services if funding arrangements, contracting, staffing and coordination do not transition smoothly.⁶³

A third option is Aleppo (city and countryside) as a “scale and pressure” case. Aleppo is demographically large and includes highly varied contexts—damaged urban neighbourhoods,⁶⁴ large displacement,⁶⁵ and strained service infrastructure.⁶⁶ It is also likely to remain a magnet for movement and returns,⁶⁷ which puts additional strain on schools, PHCs, nutrition services and WASH systems.

A fourth, important case-study to add is the coastal

⁶¹Recommendation taken from the ECDiC Focus Group Discussion held on January 15, 2026.

⁶²Refugee International, *Beyond the Fall: Rebuilding Syria After Assad*. [LINK](#)

⁶³Insights driven from interviews previously conducted with NGO workers in Syria by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited.

⁶⁴World Bank, *Syria’s Post-Conflict Reconstruction Costs Estimated at \$216 billion*. [LINK](#)

⁶⁵ReliefWeb, *IOM Syrian Arab Republic — Aleppo Governorate Snapshot (September 2025)*. [LINK](#)

⁶⁶ReliefWeb, *IOM Syrian Arab Republic — Aleppo Governorate Snapshot (September 2025)*. [LINK](#)

⁶⁷ReliefWeb, *IOM Syrian Arab Republic — Aleppo Governorate Snapshot (September 2025)*. [LINK](#)

governorates (Lattakia and Tartous). The coast was widely seen as the former regime’s political and social stronghold and—in the post-collapse environment—there are risks of marginalisation, heightened social tensions, and a deepening economic crisis that could directly affect service provision and household coping strategies.⁶⁸ This is also relevant to the HRP narrative noting that recent violence escalation in coastal areas⁶⁹ may worsen outcomes for the population, especially women and children due to displacement⁷⁰ platforms. The Brussels Conferences on “Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region”⁷¹ have historically played a central role in mobilising political attention, donor pledges, and normative commitments to education, child protection, and early recovery, including ECD-relevant sectors. While these conferences have helped sustain international engagement and signal collective responsibility, they have primarily channelled resources through humanitarian and multilateral actors rather than independent philanthropic foundations, and have not generated a dedicated global philanthropic pipeline for ECD in Syria.

Among global foundations, the Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) stands out as a rare example of sustained, programmatic engagement, with a reported USD 100 million portfolio in Syria⁷² spanning education, ECD, civil society strengthening, and institutional capacity-building, including support to the Regional ECD Center. By contrast, global ECD advocacy coalitions—such as Theirworld and the Act Early Years campaign⁷³—have contributed mainly through agenda-setting and policy advocacy, helping elevate ECD within global financing

debates, but without direct operational or financial presence inside Syria. UNICEF, while formally a UN agency, continues to function as a quasi-philanthropic channel by mobilising both public and private global resources, and remains the most consistently identified financier and institutional champion of ECD in the Syrian context.⁷⁴

Finally, growing interest from Gulf actors (notably Qatar⁷⁵ and Saudi Arabia⁷⁶) is better understood as state-led or quasi-state financing and investment—often tied to broader geopolitical, reconstruction, or infrastructure agendas—rather than structured ECD philanthropy. Nevertheless, such engagement may indirectly shape the fiscal and political space within which domestic community financing, humanitarian actors, and private ECD provision operate, particularly as international aid volumes decline and expectations of “self-reliance” increase.



⁶⁸UK Visas and Immigration, *Guidance Country policy and information note: Alawites and actual or perceived Assadists, Syria, July 2025* (accessible). [LINK](#)

⁶⁹UNHCR, *UN Syria Commission finds March coastal violence was widespread and systematic: outlines urgent steps to prevent future violations and restore public confidence*. [LINK](#)

⁷⁰Humanitarian Action, 3.1 Protection. [LINK](#)

⁷¹European Council, *Council of the European Union, 2025 Brussels IX Conference on ‘Supporting the future of Syria and the region’*. [LINK](#)

⁷²Agha Khan Development Network, *Ismaili Imam pledges €100 million for Syria’s development*. [LINK](#)

⁷³Theirworld, *After 12 years of war, education is still the key for Syrian refugees*. [LINK](#)

⁷⁴Yamen Mostafa, *interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 12, 2025*.

⁷⁵SANA, *Qatari official: Qatar Committed to Support Syrians with Aid and Development Plans*. [LINK](#)

⁷⁶ReliefWeb, *KSrelief Surpasses USD 528 Million in Humanitarian Aid to Syria*. [LINK](#)

C. Timelines for Strategy Development

National ECD Strategy revision and launch

The earlier strategy (2020–2025) was finalised but not launched; following the political transition, it is now being updated to fit the new context. The initial launch of the revamped strategy (November 20, 2025) was delayed after gaps and tensions were identified; it is currently under revision with multiple ministries, and its eventual adoption is seen as a key opportunity to create clearer responsibilities and budget lines for ECD.⁷⁷

ECD strategy workshops (mid-2025)

UNICEF reports workshops in July–August bringing together ministries, directorates, and civil society to review the strategy and raise awareness of ECD's importance. These events were already used to start shifting mindsets and could be repeated or leveraged as advocacy platforms for increased funding in 2026 and beyond.⁷⁸

Annual ministerial budget cycles (including 2026 budget)

Ministries are currently finalising annual budgets. As long as ECD is not fully visible in these budgets, each annual budgeting round is a key opportunity to argue for dedicated lines and higher allocations.

Humanitarian funding allocation cycles

The pooled funds and donors revise their allocation strategy periodically and require proposals to be inter-sectoral. ECD has been included in recent rounds but is not at the top of priorities. Upcoming allocation cycles are moments when advocates can push for stronger ECD components in multi-sector packages.⁷⁹

Education Cluster and Local Education Group (LEG)

The national education cluster (co-led with MoE) strongly shapes donor priorities; its recommendations will guide which sectors and activities receive funding going forward.⁸⁰ Moreover, a new Local Education Group (LEG) led by the MoE and major global donors is being set up, providing a fresh platform where ECD could be framed as an integral component of education reforms and sector support.⁸¹

World Bank's renewed engagement

The World Bank's growing relationship with the new government is seen as a medium-term opportunity: as it designs social sector or education support operations, ECD advocates could push for explicit ECD components in Bank-financed programmes.⁸²

⁷⁷ReliefWeb, *KSrelief Surpasses USD 528 Million in Humanitarian Aid to Syria*. [LINK](#)

⁷⁸Yamen Mostafa, *interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 12, 2025*.

⁷⁹Murad Maithalouni, *interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 17, 2025*.

⁸⁰Hozyfa Al-Tfankji, *interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 12, 2025*; Moustafa Qaei, *interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 12, 2025*

⁸¹Hozyfa Al-Tfankji, *interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 12, 2025*; Yamen Mostafa, *interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 12, 2025*

⁸²Yamen Mostafa, *interview by Karam Shaar Advisory Limited, online, November 12, 2025*.

D. Conclusion

Syria's distinctly young population remains in urgent need of an improved ECD landscape. The systems meant to safeguard children's health, nutrition, protection and early learning have been significantly weakened by over a decade of conflict. Although public budgets have expanded in nominal terms, their real value has eroded almost entirely due to inflation and currency collapse, leaving the combined allocations of MoE, MoH, and MoSAL at only a fraction of pre-crisis levels. These allocations fall far below what is required to address rising humanitarian needs and the burden on overstretched public services continues to grow.

The ongoing revision of the national ECD strategy since December 2024 offers a chance to clarify institutional roles, strengthen inter-ministerial coordination, and embed ECD more firmly within future budgets. Yet these opportunities coexist with significant constraints: limited implementation capacity, weak accountability systems, inconsistent coordination and the near-total absence of transparent, disaggregated public finance information. Critically, the lack of an ECD budget line or expenditure tracking mechanism across both government and humanitarian channels means that neither authorities nor partners can see where resources flow or ensure that the youngest and most vulnerable children are reached.

Ultimately, the scale of need continues to far outweigh available funding, but there are steps that can meaningfully improve outcomes. Strengthening coordination, both horizontally among ministries and vertically across administrative levels, can help reduce duplication and close key service gaps. Increasing transparency and gradually restoring public financial reporting would allow partners to align better with national priorities and collectively advocate for more equitable budget allocations. Prioritising the use of existing and incremental resources more strategically for ECD can help ensure that essential services remain operational even in periods of fiscal constraint.

These measures can help ensure that its youngest children are not left to bear the brunt of prolonged instability. With better coordination, greater transparency and more deliberate resource allocation, Syria can begin laying the foundation for improved survival, development and learning outcomes in the years ahead.



► Homs, Syria. Bayan, 32, helps her children with their studies.

E. Annexes

Annex 1: Budget Analysis

Adequacy

Adequacy is clearly very low, with a substantial—though unquantified—funding shortfall for ECD. Humanitarian financing has not kept pace with rising needs: people in need increased from 11.1 million in 2020 to 16.5 million in 2025, while overall funding coverage fell from roughly 63% to 27%. Requirements have exceeded USD 5 billion in some years, and recent response plans remain several billion dollars underfunded, directly affecting education, health, nutrition and WASH—core pillars of ECD.

On the government side, social-sector budgets have collapsed in real USD terms due to the currency crash. Although nominal SYP allocations are rising, the 2024 budgets for Health, Education and Social Affairs together amount to only a few hundred million dollars, severely constraining service delivery.

Impacts on young children are stark. Some 2.45 million children remain out of school, and millions more attend overcrowded, poorly equipped classrooms. Health and nutrition services report major gaps, facility closures and rising rates of untreated severe acute malnutrition among children under five. WASH services for IDPs and host communities are also heavily underfunded.

Because ministries do not report ECD-specific budget lines, it is impossible to quantify a precise “ECD funding gap.” However, the available evidence overwhelmingly indicates severe under-provision relative to the needs of children aged 0–8.

Efficiency

Government execution rates appear relatively strong on paper, but structural and operational constraints significantly limit real efficiency. State budget execution has improved from roughly 50–70% in the early conflict years to about 85–95% in 2021–2023, indicating that ministries do spend most of what they receive. Yet they are executing a very small and unstable envelope in real terms, with investment spending repeatedly compressed.

In 2025, the “one-twelfth” system—issuing monthly allocations equal to one month of the 2024 budget—keeps salaries and basic operations running but effectively freezes new investments. This makes it nearly impossible for ministries to plan multi-year ECD expansions or undertake major rehabilitation projects, sharply reducing efficiency for any reform or scale-up.

At service level, health, education, nutrition and WASH providers face widespread facility dysfunction, acute staff shortages, extremely low pay, and slow or cumbersome planning and administrative processes. Even when funds are formally disbursed, these bottlenecks prevent them from translating into timely, quality services for young children.

Overall, while most state funds allocated to ECD are likely spent, the combination of very limited resources and weak systems means resource use is only moderately efficient at best.

²Except for the ECD Regional Center item within the MoE budget lines. However, the needs of the ECD Regional Center are not known.

Effectiveness

Spending is only partly aligned with ECD priorities, and several structural biases weaken overall effectiveness. Since 2011, the state has prioritised security and short-term subsidies, sharply reducing development and social spending. In the humanitarian system, funding tends to favour visible, tangible “hardware” such as school rehabilitation, emergency health and water infrastructure—important, but insufficient for strong ECD outcomes.

Across sectors, critical ECD-relevant gaps persist. Education budgets focus on keeping schools functioning, leaving little room for ECE classrooms, play-based learning materials, caregiver training or improved early-grade pedagogy. Health resources are absorbed by emergencies, outbreaks and noncommunicable diseases (NCD) care, pushing routine maternal and child health and MHPSS to the margins. Nutrition programmes still struggle to cover basic treatment and prevention, especially for children aged 0–2, with many stabilisation centres and mobile teams closing.

Short, one-year humanitarian grants further incentivise quick, easily reportable outputs—rehabilitation or distributions—over longer-term investments such as workforce development, early screening systems or parenting support. As a result, while some spending contributes to ECD foundations, it remains poorly aligned with what is most effective in early childhood. ECD funding therefore delivers only partial effectiveness in outcome terms.

Equity

The pattern of provision is clearly inequitable across income, geography and status. Geographic disparities are stark: Northwest and Northeast Syria—both heavily affected by conflict, U.S. funding cuts and service fragmentation—are losing health, nutrition and WASH facilities even as needs rise. Nutrition coverage is particularly weak in Suweida, Hassakeh, Raqqa, Deir-ez-Zor, Rural Damascus, Daraa and hard-to-reach pockets of Hama, Homs, Idlib and Aleppo. Damage to power and WASH infrastructure is acute in Aleppo, Hassakeh, Deir-ez-Zor and parts of the coast, leaving many communities reliant on unsafe water trucking or minimal services.

Socio-economic inequities further compound these gaps. Pre-school and ECE have long been dominated by private, fee-based urban providers, effectively excluding poorer, rural and displaced families. Today’s economic collapse forces many households to pull children out of school or delay enrolment, especially in low-income and rural areas.

Displacement adds another layer of exclusion. IDPs in camps and informal settlements typically face worse access to education, health, nutrition and WASH, with girls and children with disabilities encountering additional barriers. Refugees abroad—over six million—are constrained by restrictive host-country policies, xenophobia and unstable support systems.

For ECD, the result is a highly unequal landscape in which the youngest, poorest, most remote and most displaced children are the least likely to receive sustained, quality services.

Transparency

Transparency remains very weak, particularly for sectoral and ECD-related spending. The government does not systematically publish detailed budget books or final accounts, and historically a large share of expenditures sat in “unallocated” chapters—around 15% in 2010—covering opaque items such as military spending through the Public Debt Fund. Although this has improved numerically, underlying classifications remain non-transparent.

Sectoral detail is similarly limited. While aggregate figures for Health, Education and Social Affairs are available through the official gazette, the state does not publish disaggregated data on pre-primary spending, early grades, child protection, maternal and child health or nutrition. ECD-relevant expenditures are scattered across multiple headings—education, health, social assistance, disability, subsidies—with no unified ECD budget line.

Since the transition, transparency has not improved meaningfully. The government is operating under provisional “one-twelfth” rules, and although local budget discussions (e.g., Aleppo) have been mentioned, no full 2025 budget has been released, and little is known about the forthcoming supplementary and 2026 budgets.

From an ECD perspective, visibility is extremely low: we cannot reliably determine what the government allocates or spends on ECD, nor meaningfully connect public and humanitarian financial flows

Accountability

Formal oversight structures exist, but practical accountability for ECD spending is very weak. The Central Financial Control Authority reviews public accounts, yet it reports to the executive and its findings are not published. Parliamentary oversight is formally mandated, but has been minimal during and after the conflict; under the Constitutional Declaration, the People’s Assembly should play a stronger role, but it has not yet been constituted, leaving a major gap in scrutiny.

ECD spending cannot be tracked in any meaningful way. Because allocations are not tagged as ECD, neither the government nor partners can follow spending across Education, Health, Social Affairs or local administrations. There is no public mechanism to trace funds from national and external sources down to service-delivery points such as schools, health centres or community ECD spaces.

On the aid side, accountability is also fragmented. Donors and UN agencies rely on their own reporting systems, which provide visibility on humanitarian projects but are not integrated into national public finance systems. Abrupt funding cuts—such as recent US decisions affecting health and nutrition—show how beneficiaries can experience immediate service collapse with no joint framework to manage the shock or ensure continuity of essential ECD services.

For ECD, this means basic accountability questions—how much is being spent, where, by whom, and with what results—cannot be answered. The architecture needed to monitor and enforce ECD financing commitments is largely absent.

Annex 2: Documents related to the ECD Regional Center

Law No. 17 of 2012 Establishing the Regional Center for Early Childhood Development

Law No. 17 of 2012

Establishing the Regional Center for Early Childhood Development

The President of the Republic

Pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution,

And to what was approved by the People's Assembly in its session held on 5/5/1433 AH, corresponding to 28/3/2012 AD, Issues the following:

Chapter One – Definitions

Article (1):

For the purposes of implementing the provisions of this Law, the following terms shall have the meanings assigned to each of them below:

- ▶ The Ministry: The Ministry of Education in the Syrian Arab Republic.
- ▶ The Minister: The Minister of Education in the Syrian Arab Republic.
- ▶ The Council: The Board of Directors of the Regional Center for Early Childhood Development.
- ▶ The Director: The Director of the Regional Center for Early Childhood Development.
- ▶ The Center: The Regional Center for Early Childhood Development.
- ▶ UNESCO: The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation.
- ▶ The Arab Region: The Arab countries listed within UNESCO's regional delineation.

Chapter Two – Establishment of the Center

Article (2):

A regional center named the Regional Center for Early Childhood Development shall be established in the Syrian Arab Republic, headquartered in the city of Damascus. The Center shall enjoy legal personality and financial independence and shall be affiliated with the Minister.

Chapter Three – Objectives and Functions of the Center

Article (3):

A. Objectives of the Center:

The Center aims to achieve the following:

1. Build national and regional capacities in the field of care and education during early childhood, enhance cooperation, and strengthen networks for the transfer of specialised knowledge related to this stage.
2. Contribute to the achievement of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals and the Education for All goals.
3. Train relevant staff in competent ministries and other concerned entities involved in early childhood care and education in the region on policy-making processes, in ways that enable the provision of in-service training programmes.

B. Functions of the Center:

1. Facilitate awareness within the region regarding key issues related to the development of early childhood care and education.
2. Train trainers in order to enhance the capacities of the workforce in early childhood care and education, with particular priority during the first two or three years given to teachers specialised in pre-primary education.
3. Facilitate access to professional and technical information in Arabic related to educational policy formulation issues, as well as to capacity-building of the workforce in other countries of the region in matters related to early childhood care and education.
4. Train regional professional and academic personnel concerned with early childhood care and education in applied research through fact-finding and analytical activities, with a focus on the specific needs of countries in the Arab region.

Chapter Four – Board of Directors

Article (4):

A. The management of the Center shall be undertaken by:

1. A Board of Directors whose functions are defined in accordance with the provisions of this Law, and which is renewed every two years.
2. A Director of the Center, whose functions are defined in the Center's internal regulations.

B. The management of the Center shall be undertaken by:

1. The Minister, Chairperson of the Board, representing the Government.
2. The competent Deputy Minister, a member.
3. The Director, a member.
4. A representative of the member states that have submitted notifications requesting membership, a member.
5. A representative of the Director-General of UNESCO, a member.
6. A representative of the State Planning and International Cooperation Commission, a member.

C. The Board may invite whomever it deems appropriate to attend its meetings without having the right to vote.

Article (5):

A. The Board shall undertake the following functions:

1. Approve the Center's medium- and long-term regional programmes.
2. Approve the Center's work plan.
3. Review the draft annual budget of the Center in preparation for its approval by the competent authorities.
4. Review the annual reports submitted by the Director.
5. Approve the lists and regulations of the Center and determine financial and administrative procedures in accordance with applicable laws and regulations.
6. Decide on the participation of regional governmental international organisations and international organisations in the Center's activities.

B. Meetings of the Board shall not be deemed legally valid unless attended by a majority of its members, including the Chairperson. In the Chairperson's absence, the competent Deputy Minister of Education shall preside over the Board

Article (6):

The Board shall convene in an ordinary session every six months, holding two meetings per year, and may convene in an extraordinary session upon invitation by the Chairperson or upon a request submitted by the Director-General of UNESCO or by one-third of its members.

Article (7):

The Minister shall be the authorising officer for expenditure, liquidation, and disbursement of all expenses of the Center.

Article (8):

The Center shall have an independent budget issued by decision of the Minister upon the proposal of the Board of Directors and after approval by the Ministry of Finance. The budget shall include all revenues and expenditures, ensure balance between revenues and expenditures, and constitute an independent accounting unit. Its revenues shall consist of the following sources:

1. Allocations designated in the State's general budget.
2. Fees from kindergartens affiliated with the Center.
3. Paid courses and activities conducted by the Center.
4. Grants, donations, gifts, and endowments provided in accordance with applicable laws and regulations, which shall be exempt from all financial, customs, and municipal taxes and fees of all kinds.
5. Contributions from international organisations.
6. Any other revenues permitted by applicable laws and regulations.

Chapter Five – Administrative and Technical Body of the Center

Article (9):

The Center shall be considered a public administrative entity. Its internal regulations shall be issued by decision of the Minister and shall include the administrative structure and the duties and powers of staff. The financial regulations shall be issued by decision of the Minister in coordination with the Minister of Finance.

Article (10):

The staffing establishment of the Center shall be issued by decree.

Article (11):

Employees of the Center shall be subject to the provisions of the Basic Law for State Employees No. 50 of 2004 and the Social Insurance Law No. 92 of 1959 and their amendments.

Chapter Six – Transitional and Final Provisions

Article (12):

The Minister may assign researchers from outside the Center to carry out tasks required by the Center. Their remuneration shall be determined by decision of the Board of Directors in coordination with the Ministry of Finance.

Article (13):

The Center may establish model kindergartens affiliated with it when required by the interest of work. Their administrative and financial organisation shall be regulated in the internal and financial regulations of the Center.

Article (14):

This Law shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall enter into force as of the date of its issuance.

Issued in Damascus on 6/5/1433 AH, corresponding to 29/3/2012 AD.

President of the Republic

Bashar al-Assad

اتفاق

بين

حكومة الجمهورية العربية السورية

و

منظمة الأمم المتحدة للتربية والعلم والثقافة

بشأن إنشاء مركز إقليمي للرعاية والتربية في مرحلة الطفولة المبكرة

في الدول العربية، في الجمهورية العربية السورية

بوصفه مركزاً من الفئة (٢)

يعمل تحت رعاية اليونسكو

إن حكومة الجمهورية العربية السورية

و

منظمة الأمم المتحدة للتربية والعلم والثقافة (اليونسكو)،

بناء على القرار ٨/٢٩ الذي شدد فيه المؤتمر العام لليونسكو على الحاجة إلى بناء القدرات فيما يخص برامج الرعاية والتربية في مرحلة الطفولة المبكرة. وبالنظر إلى أن المؤتمر العام قد أذن للمدير العام بإبرام اتفاق مع حكومة الجمهورية العربية السورية وفقاً للمشروع الذي عرض على المؤتمر العام، ورغبة منهما في تحديد الأحكام والشروط التي تحكم إطار تعاون اليونسكو مع المركز المذكور في هذا الاتفاق،

قد اتفقا على ما يلي:

المادة ١- التعاريف

- ١- تشير كلمة "اليونسكو" في هذا الاتفاق إلى منظمة الأمم المتحدة للتربية والعلم والثقافة.
- ٢- تشير كلمة "الحكومة" إلى حكومة الجمهورية العربية السورية.
- ٣- تشير كلمة "المركز" إلى المركز الإقليمي المقترح للرعاية والتربية في مرحلة الطفولة المبكرة في الدول العربية.
- ٤- تشير كلمة "المنطقة العربية" إلى الدول العربية المذكورة في تحديد المناطق الخاص باليونسكو.

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- (ب) المساهمة في تحقيق أهداف الأمم المتحدة الإنمائية للألفية، وفي تحقيق أهداف التعليم للجميع، الواردة في إطار عمل دكا، بحلول عام ٢٠١٥؛
- (ج) تدريب كبار المسؤولين في وزارات التربية وغيرها من الوزارات والوكالات ذات الصلة بالرعاية والتربية في مرحلة الطفولة المبكرة في المنطقة (وزارات الصحة والرعاية الاجتماعية، والمنظمات غير الحكومية، ومنظمات المجتمع الأهلي) على عمليات رسم السياسات، بطرائق تتيح توفير دورات تدريبية أثناء العمل.

وتتمثل مهام المركز فيما يلي:

- (أ) تيسير الوعي داخل وزارات التربية في المنطقة بشأن المسائل الأساسية المتعلقة بتنمية الرعاية والتربية في الطفولة المبكرة والتي تتمس بالأولوية بالنسبة إلى بلدان المنطقة؛
- (ب) " تدريب المدربين " من أجل الارتقاء بقدرات القوى العاملة في مجال الرعاية والتربية في مرحلة الطفولة المبكرة، مع إيلاء اهتمام خاص على سبيل الأولوية خلال السنتين أو السنوات الثلاث المقبلة، للمعلمين المختصين في التعليم قبل الابتدائي؛
- (ج) تيسير الانتفاع بمعلومات مهنية تقنية باللغة العربية تتعلق بقضايا إعداد السياسات التربوية، وكذلك بقضايا الارتقاء بقدرات القوى العاملة في بلدان أخرى من المنطقة، مما يتعلق بالرعاية والتربية في مرحلة الطفولة المبكرة؛
- (د) تدريب القوى العاملة المهنية والأكاديمية الإقليمية المعنية بالرعاية والتربية في مرحلة الطفولة المبكرة على البحوث التطبيقية عن طريق تقصي الحقائق والقيام بأنشطة تحليلية، مع التركيز على الاحتياجات الخاصة لبلدان المنطقة العربية.

المادة ٧- مجلس الإدارة

- ١- يتولى توجيه المركز والإشراف عليه مجلس إدارة يتجدد كل سنتين ويتألف من:
- (أ) ممثل للحكومة أو من يعين لتمثله؛
- (ب) ممثل للدول الأعضاء التي أرسلت إلى المركز إخطاراً بطلب العضوية طبقاً لأحكام المادة (١٠)-
- (٢) أدناه، و أمرت عن اهتمامها بأن تكون ممثلة في المجلس؛
- (ج) ممثل للمدير العام لليونسكو.
- ٢- وسيترأس مجلس الإدارة وزير التربية في الجمهورية العربية السورية، الذي يكون أيضاً ممثلاً للحكومة على النحو المحدد في الفقرة ٧-١ (أ).

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- ٣- يقوم مجلس الإدارة بالمهام التالية:
- (أ) الموافقة على برامج المركز للأجلين المتوسط والطويل؛
- (ب) الموافقة على خطة العمل والميزانية السنويتين للمركز؛ بما في ذلك جدول الموظفين؛
- (ج) دراسة التقارير السنوية التي يقدمها إليه مدير المركز؛
- (د) اعتماد القوائم واللوائح الخاصة بالمركز؛ وتحديد الإجراءات المالية والإدارية والإجراءات المتعلقة بإدارة شؤون موظفي المركز وفقاً للقوانين المرعية في البلد المعنى؛
- (هـ) البت في مسألة مشاركة المنظمات الدولية الحكومية الإقليمية والمنظمات الدولية في أعمال المركز.
- ٤- يجتمع مجلس الإدارة في دورة عادية في آجال منتظمة بواقع اجتماع واحد على الأقل في كل سنة تقويمية. ويجتمع المجلس في دورة استثنائية إذا دعاه رئيسه إلى الانعقاد، وذلك بناء على مبادرة منه أو بناءً على طلب يقدمه المدير العام لليونسكو أو ثلثاً أعضائه.
- ٥- يعتمد مجلس الإدارة نظامه الداخلي. وتقوم الحكومة واليونسكو بتحديد الإجراءات التي تتبع في اجتماعه الأول.

المادة ٨- مساهمة اليونسكو

- ١- يمكن لليونسكو أن تقدم، عند الاقتضاء، مساعدة تكون على شكل مساهمة تقنية في أنشطة برامج المركز، على نحو يتفق مع الغايات والأهداف الإستراتيجية لليونسكو، وذلك عن طريق:
- (أ) تقديم مساعدة خبرائها في مجالات تخصص المركز؛
- (ب) إجراء عمليات تبادل مؤقت للموظفين، على أن يبقى الموظفون المعنيون مدرجين في كشوف مرتبات المنظمات التي توفدهم؛
- (ج) إعاره بعض موظفيها بصورة مؤقتة إذا ما قرر المدير العام ذلك بصفة استثنائية، وسوفه تنفيذ نشاط أو مشروع مشترك في إطار إحدى الأولويات الإستراتيجية للبرنامج.
- ٢- في جميع الحالات المذكورة أعلاه، لا تقدم هذه المساعدة إلا في إطار ما ينص عليه برنامج وميزانية اليونسكو. وستوفر المنظمة للدول الأعضاء كسفاً عن الحسابات المتعلقة باستخدام الموظفين والتكاليف ذات الصلة.

المادة ٩- مساهمة الحكومة

- ١- توفر الحكومة جديم الموارد المالية والعينية الضرورية لإدارة المركز وتشغيله على النحو السليم.

٢- تتعهد الحكومة بما يلي:

- (أ) أن تضم تحت تصرف المركز كل ما يلزمه من مرافق لتحقيق أهدافه وأداء مهامه؛
- (ب) أن تتحمل كامل مسؤولية صيانة مبنى المؤسسة بوصفها مركزاً من الفئة (٢) يعمل تحت رهاية اليونسكو؛
- (ج) أن تساهم أو تزمن المساهمة الإقليمية في المركز بالمبلغ اللازم لتغطية تكاليف الترميم والتشغيل والصيانة؛
- (د) أن تضع في متناول المركز الموظفين الإداريين اللازمين لأداء مهامه، على أن يتألف هؤلاء من فريق أساسي يضم موظفي دعم وباحثين يستخدمون لفترة مؤقتة أو يعملون بوقت جزئي، بالإضافة إلى فريق خاص بالمكتبة مؤلف من ٥ إلى ١٠ أشخاص، في أي وقت كان.

المادة ١٠- المشاركة

- ١- يشجع المركز مشاركة الدول الأعضاء في اليونسكو والأعضاء المنتسبين إليها ممن يرغبون في التعاون مع المركز بدافع اهتمامهم المشترك بأهدافه.
- ٢- ترسل الدول الأعضاء في اليونسكو والأعضاء المنتسبين إليها ممن يرغبون في المشاركة في أنشطة المركز على النحو المحدد في هذا الاتفاق، إخطاراً بهذا المعنى إلى المركز. ويبلغ المدير طرفي الاتفاق والدول الأعضاء الأخرى بتسلم مثل هذه الإخطارات.

المادة ١١- المسؤولية

لما كان المركز مستقلاً من الناحية القانونية عن اليونسكو، فإن المنظمة غير مسؤولة من الناحية القانونية عن أي فعل يقوم به المركز أو لا يقوم به، كما لا تخضع لأي إجراء قانوني نتيجة لذلك ولا تتحمل إزاءه أي التزامات من أي نوع، مالية كانت أو غير مالية، باستثناء ما تنص عليه صراحة أحكام هذا الاتفاق.

المادة ١٢- التقييم

- ١- يجوز لليونسكو أن تجري، في أي وقت، تقييماً لأنشطة المركز بغية التحقق مما يلي:
- (أ) إذا كان المركز يسهم إسهاماً ملموساً في تحقيق الأغراض الاستراتيجية لليونسكو؛
- (ب) إذا كانت الأنشطة التي يضطلع بها المركز بالنظر في تنطبق مع الأنشطة المبينة في هذا الاتفاق.

١٤ ١٤

- ٢- تتعهد اليونسكو بموافاة الحكومة، في أقرب وقت ممكن، بتقرير عن أي تقييم تجريه بشأن المركز.
- ٣- يجوز لكل من الطرفين المتعاقدين أن يطلب، على ضوء نتائج أي تقييم يتم إجراؤه، تعديل مضمون هذا الاتفاق أو إنهائه طبقاً لما تنص عليه المادتان (١٦ و١٧).

المادة ١٣ - استخدام اسم اليونسكو وشعارها

- ١- يجوز للمركز أن يشير إلى علاقته مع اليونسكو. ويمكنه بالتالي أن يتبع اسمه بعبارة " يعمل تحت رعاية اليونسكو".
- ٢- يرخص للمركز باستخدام شعار اليونسكو أو صيغة منه كعلامة مميزة في أوراقه ووثائقه وفقاً للشروط التي حددتها الهيئتان الرئاسيتان لليونسكو.

المادة ١٤ - دخول الاتفاق حيز النفاذ

يدخل هذا الاتفاق حيز النفاذ بعد توقيع الطرفين المتعاقدين عليه، وعندما يكون قد أحضر أحدهما الآخر كتابةً باستكمال جميع الإجراءات الرسمية المطلوبة لهذا الغرض بموجب القوانين الداخلية للجمهورية العربية السورية والنظم الداخلية لليونسكو. ويعتبر تاريخ تسلم الإخطار الأخير تاريخ دخول هذا الاتفاق حيز النفاذ.

المادة ١٥ - مدة الاتفاق

يبرم هذا الاتفاق لفترة ثلاث سنوات ابتداءً من تاريخ دخوله حيز النفاذ، وسيعتبر ممدداً ما لم يقدم أحد الطرفين على إنهائه صراحةً وفقاً لما هو منصوص عليه في المادة (١٦).

المادة ١٦ - إنهاء الاتفاق

- ١- يحق لأي من الطرفين المتعاقدين إنهاء هذا الاتفاق من جانب واحد.
- ٢- يصبح الإنهاء نافذاً بعد مضي (٦٠) يوماً على تاريخ تسلم أحد الطرفين المتعاقدين إخطار الإنهاء الموجه إليه من الطرف الآخر.

المادة ١٧ - تعديل الاتفاق

يجوز تعديل هذا الاتفاق بالتراضي بين الحكومة واليونسكو.

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المادة ١٨ - تسوية الخلافات

- ١- يعرض أي خلاف ينشأ بين اليونسكو والحكومة المعنية بشأن تفسير هذا الاتفاق أو تطبيقه، في حال تعذر حله بالتفاوض أو بأي طريقة أخرى مناسبة يتفق عليها الطرفان، على هيئة تحكيم لاتخاذ قرار نهائي بشأنه. وتتألف هذه الهيئة من ثلاثة أعضاء يعين ممثل الحكومة أحدهم، ويعين المدير العام لليونسكو ثانيهم. ويقوم هذان المحكمان بتعيين المحكم الثالث الذي سيتألف هيئة التحكيم. وإذا تعذر على المحكمين الاتفاق على اختيار المحكم الثالث يمكن لليونسكو استخدام إحدى الطرق القانونية المعتمدة لديها في هذا المجال.
- ٢- يكون قرار هيئة التحكيم نهائياً.

وإثباتاً لما تقدم، وقع الممثلان المذكوران أدناه على هذا الاتفاق.

حرر في نسختين باللغة الانكليزية ونسختين باللغة العربية في السبت ٢٤ / ٤ / ٢٠١٠

من حكومة
الجمهورية العربية السورية

الدكتور على سعد
وزير التربية

من منسمة الأمم المتحدة

للتربية والعلم والثقافة

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المدير العام لليونسكو

Country Profile: Syria

Mobilising Local Financing for ECD in Crisis (ECDiC)

An institutional and fiscal
analysis of ECD-relevant sectors
amid Syria's political transition

Prepared for: Moving Minds Alliance;
International Rescue Committee

Prepared by: Karam Shaar Advisory Limited

Photos: International Rescue Committee

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